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A. INTRODUCTION

In the late 1800's and early 1900's the United States Supreme Court
twice upheld the validity and enforcement of state laws denying medical
licensure to physicians who had performed abortions that were then

considered unlawful and criminal. The cases were Hawker v. New York' in
1898 and Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North2 in 1926. These decisions were
indisputably relevant, but were never cited during the litigation that
culminated with the abortion cases of 1973.3
It appears that counsel opposing the constitutional decriminalization of
abortion 4 and the dissenting Justices White5 and Rehnquist 6 all overlooked
Hawker and Hurwitz.7 The full records, briefs, and arguments of these two

early cases are in the Library of Congress, Madison Building, and National
Archives in Washington, D.C. and in other major law libraries.8
B. DR.

HAWKER IN NEW YORK

Allegedly a doctor,9 Benjamin Hawker was tried and convicted of
felony abortion on March 6, 1878, a decade after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' ° There was no suggestion in the court's opinion
* The author wrote the first article on abortion and the constitutional right to privacy while he was
a law student at New York University School of Law in 1966-67. Subsequently, he published that
work as Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion
Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REV. 730 (1968). At New York University School of Law he was on the Law
Review, Order of the Coif, a Root-Tilden Scholar, and a Rotary Foundation Fellow in the United
Kingdom from 1965-66. He wrote two briefs in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and argued Baird v. Bellotti (1), 428 U.S. 132 (176), and two other
cases in the United States Supreme Court. His multidisciplinary careers are described in WHO'S
WHO INAMERICA (MILLENNIUM ED. 2000). He is the author of The Genesis of Roe v. Wade and
Doe v. Bolton: an Inside Story (in progress), from which this piece is adapted.
1. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
2. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926).
3. The cases best known to the public are Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
4. The attorney general of Texas, joined by numerous amici, defended the Texas abortion
statute in Roe v. Wade. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
5. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 221-22 (White, J., dissenting).
6. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 174-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. In their Roe and Doe dissenting opinions, Justices White and Rehnquist might have noted: (i)
the Justices in the Hawker and Hurwitz decisions took for granted the constitutional validity of the
criminal abortion laws at the turn of the 19th century and during the first quarter of the 20th century;
(ii) in 1898 and 1926 the participation of a physician in abortions was a felony, indicative of criminal
character, and permanently disqualified the physician from the practice of medicine; and (iii)
Hawker and North were fifty years closer to the original passage and the Fourteenth Amendment.
8. To the author's knowledge, only one participating counsel, the author, asserting the
constitutional right to abortion, even knew of Hawker and Hurwitz. Counsel did not raise these
precedents for two reasons: (i) the briefs were already lengthy; and (ii) Hawker and Hurwitz only
indirectly endorsed the validity of abortion laws and were marginally relevant.
9. It appears that Dr. Hawker was not actually a licensed or accredited physician. See People v.
Hawker, 152 N.Y. 234, 241 (1897). These were early years in the organization and regulation of the
health care professions. Lister had published his views on aseptic techniques only a decade earlier.
See Sir Joseph Lister, On a New Method of Treating Compound Fractures, THE LANCET, p. 1, Mar
16, 1867.
10. Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment on July 21, 1868, and Dr. Hawker was
convicted of felony abortion ten years later in 1878.
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that the abortion was necessary to save the woman's life. 1 His punishment
was a prison term of ten years. The charges did not allege any malpractice
or injury to the woman. In 1893, New York enacted a new Public Health
Law c. 661, as amended by the laws of 1895 c. 398, § 153, making it a crime
to practice medicine "after conviction of a felony" whether or not the felon
had reestablished his good character.12 In April 1896, a grand jury indicted
Hawker for practicing medicine in violation of §153, based upon his 1878
felony abortion conviction.1 3 Hawker was tried, convicted, and sentenced to
pay a fine. 14 The New York courts upheld the conviction," and Hawker
appealed to the United States Supreme Court in 1898.
In the Supreme Court Dr. Hawker challenged his conviction for the
illegal practice of medicine as being based upon an ex post facto law in
violation of Article I, §10 of the United States Constitution, which flatly
prohibits ex post facto laws. 16 Dr. Hawker argued that he had fully served
his punishment, even before the 1893 law was passed and that the new law
imposed an additional punishment after the fact.' 7 By a vote of six to three,
the Supreme Court disagreed with Benjamin Hawker. 8 The Court held that
a prior felony abortion conviction could be used as conclusive evidence of
bad character.' 9 Justices Harlan, Peckham, and McKenna dissented. 2 0 They
stated that the law was invalid because there was no hearing or actual proof
of bad character at the time the new law was enforced. 2 '
Nothing in the Hawker opinion questioned
the wisdom or validity of the
22
underlying New York abortion law.
Not a word was uttered about a
constitutional right of privacy, access to health care, or vagueness. 23 Yet the
earliest "privacy" cases cited by Justice Blackmun in the Roe v. Wade
11. Hawker, 152 N.Y. at238.
12. Id. at 238-39.
13. Id. at 238. There is no evidence in the opinions that any witnesses were offered as to the
good character of Dr. Hawker. See id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 243. The intermediate appellate court ruled for Dr. Hawker, but the New York Court
of Appeals reversed. Id. The appellate division noted that there was a total absence of proof of
current bad character, and would have only allowed the statute to be applied prospectively. People
v. Hawker, 43 N.Y.S. 516, 523 (App. Div. 1897).
16. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 190-91 (1898). See also U.S. CONST. article I, § 10.
17. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 191.
18. Id. at 200, 205.
19. Id. at 196.
20. Id. at 205.
21. Id. at 204.
22. Id. at 190-205.
23. See id.

643

opinion were decisions from the same era: Boyd v. United States and Union
Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford.24
It seems that it was clear to most jurists from the 1870's through the
1890's, that performing abortions was felonious behavior and not a
constitutional privacy right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At that
time, the Court would surely have rejected a contention that abortion was a
constitutionally protected right.
C. DR. HURWITZ

IN MISSOURI

In 1926, in Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, the United States Supreme
Court faced another major case involving a physician and criminal abortion
practice.2 5 This case involved a medical license suspension. 26 Dr. Leon
Hurwitz was accused of having performed an unlawful abortion upon a
woman named Almeda Stewart. While criminal charges were pending, the
State Board of
Health moved to suspend his license to practice medicine for
28
fifteen years.
Board procedures allowed a physician to develop evidence by sworn
depositions that could later be offered at a suspension hearing. 29 However,
the board process did not allow the doctor to subpoena witnesses; rather a
witness's appearance was voluntary.30
Dr. Hurwitz challenged the
procedure and process, arguing that it deprived him of due process and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 ' Witnesses appeared at the
hearing. One witness was a physician from St. John's Hospital in Missouri,
who observed the patient afterwards and reported the case to the
32
prosecutor. A police detective also testified. 33 He had stationed himself in
a room adjacent to Ms.3 4 Stewart's and had overheard incriminating
statements by Dr. Hurwitz.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886);
Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)).
271 U.S. 40(1926).
Id. at 40.
State ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 264 S.W. 678, 678 (Mo. 1924).
28. Id. at 679.
29. Hurwitz, 271 U.S. at41.
30. A likely theory behind this common practice with medical boards is that physician-witnesses
are usually too busy seeing patients and should be exempt from appearing physically at hearings and
being cross-examined.
3 I. ld. at 41-42.
32. Transcript of Record at 18, Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926) (No. 209).
24.
Union
25.
26.
27.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 19. Dr. Hurwitz allegedly said to her:
I told you any time you got to itching and you let these boys scratch it, what would be the
result, and you got that way and have no body to blame but yourself, and you came to me
yesterday and asked me to get rid of it for you, and I am doing my best, and I have come
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Dr. Hurwitz' defense was that another doctor had prescribed medicine to
cause the abortion, and that the principal witness to that effect had moved to
California.35
In an opinion by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, a unanimous Supreme
Court upheld the Missouri procedures and the lengthy suspension of Dr.
Hurwitz's license to practice medicine. 36 The Court found that it was
reasonable to allow testimony by deposition only, or, in the case of
unwilling witnesses, not at all.3 7 This was before the era of videotaped
depositions, and it was well before any heightened sensitivity toward the
nuances of procedural due process fairness.38
Modem cases are more realistic about the inherent inadequacies of
purely written testimony. 39 Goldberg v. Kelly, 40 for example, stresses the
pragmatic need for confronting adverse witnesses and notes that,
"particularly where credibility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in
many termination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly

unsatisfactory basis for decision. ''4 1 This is very true in a complex medical
license suspension case, such as Hurwitz, where a physician can be deprived
of the right to practice for a number of years, or permanently. Live crossexamination of accusers is the hallmark of modern justice in contested cases.
In the 1926 Hurwitz case, it seems that no one seriously contested the
validity of the underlying criminal abortion statute. 42 The statute was not

considered a violation of an unenumerated constitutional right to privacy or
access to health care; the criminality of performing an abortion was not

back to finish my job ....
Id. at 19(emphasis added).
35. See id. at 10.
36. Hurwitz, 271 U.S. at 42-43.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (holding that a Wisconsin statute
authorizing the posting of notices in liquor outlets which prohibited distribution of liquor to
individuals whose excessive drinking produced exhibited specified traits, such as exposing
themselves or their families to want or becoming dangerous to the peace of the community, in the
absence of a provision for notice or a hearing prior to such posting, was an unconstitutional denial of
procedural due process).
39. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process
requires holding a pre-termination evidentiary hearing when public assistance payments to a welfare
recipient are discontinued, and that procedures followed by the city of New York in terminating
public assistance payments to welfare recipients were constitutionally inadequate in failing to grant
recipients any notice or an opportunity to be heard).
40. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
41. Id.at269.
42. See Hurwitz, 271 U.S. at 40-43.

questioned.43
The New York and Missouri abortion statutes were essentially the same
as the Texas statute involved in Roe v. Wade.4 When Roe was decided,
similar statutes were in effect in the majority of other States.
D.

THE SUBSEQUENT COURSE OF THE HA WKER AND HURWITZ CASE
LAW

The Supreme Court and lower courts have continued to cite both
Hawker and Hurwitz as authority for one or more points of law. Shepard's
shows some 300 cites under Hawker and over 200 under Hurwitz. These
were not one-time decisions. A typical illustration is Semler v. Oregon State
Board of Dental Examiners:
"The state was not bound to deal alike with all these classes, or to
strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way. It could deal
with the different professions according to the needs of the public in
relation to each. We find no basis for the charge of an
unconstitutional discrimination ....
E.

HAWKER AND HuRwITz: RELEVANT TO ROE & DOE

At a minimum, Hawker and Hurwitz show the Supreme Court upholding
significant punishments of physicians for performing abortions in 1898 and
1926, without doubting the validity of the underlying abortion statutes.4 6
Neither case suggested that abortion laws implicate privacy interests or
unduly burden any rights of physicians and patients.47 There is no evidence
in the record that counsel for the physicians explicitly raised such
arguments, and the likely reason for such silence speaks volumes. The
Supreme Court, from 1868 to at least 1926, surely must have considered
restrictions on abortion to be a valid moral and societal concern. Even a
total ban on the distribution of contraceptives was unanimously upheld as
late as 1938.48 That is the next segment of the story.

43. See id.
44. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Hurwitz, 271 U.S. at 40; Hawker v. New York, 170
U.S. 189 (1898).
45. 294 U.S. 608, 610-11 (1935) (citing Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40, 43

(1926)).
46. See Hurwitz, 271 U.S. at 40; Hawker, 170 U.S. at 189.

47. See id
48. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d 222, 224 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1938).
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F.

RELEVANCE OF THE EARLY CONTRACEPTION CASES

The Supreme Court contraception and abortion cases stand or fall
almost hand-in-hand.49 If access to abortion is a constitutional right, it
follows as night upon day that contraceptive access is constitutionally
protected as well.50 Similarly, if states may ban aspects of contraceptives,
then it also follows that abortion may be limited. 5 1 Abortion is always
the
52
harder case because of additional asserted state interests in the fetus.
In 1938, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court chronicled the early
legislative and judicial activity on the related subject of birth control with its
opinion in Commonwealth v. Gardner.53 The Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors examined its similar legislative and case law activity in State v.
Nelson.54
The initial Massachusetts trek to the United States Supreme Court began
with the 1938 appeal of Commonwealth v. Gardner.55 This case involved
the prosecution of a physician who ran a birth control clinic in Salem,
Massachusetts. 56
The clinic provided contraceptives only to married
women. 57 The Commonwealth high court in Gardner unanimously upheld
the convictions 8 The court rejected any interpretation of the statute that
would exempt physicians Xrescribing contraception for the health and well
being of married patients.
The court declined to hold that there were any
exceptions. 60 The Massachusetts high court stated that the legislative
purpose of the law was to prevent "sexual immorality." 6 1 Dr. Gardner
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.6 2 The Commonwealth did not
49. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (explaining that both contraception and
abortion rights are protected by the due process clause); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (providing that the
right of privacy protects both contraception and abortion).
50. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 150.
53. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d at 222.
54. State v. Nelson, II A.2d 856, 858-59 (Conn. 1940); Sturgis v. Attorney General, 260 N.E.2d
687 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1970). This reconfirmed the Massachusetts Court's rejection of challenges
to anti-conception laws as late as 1970.
55. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d at 222. Massachusetts law prohibited the selling, lending, or giving
away any "drug, medicine, instrument or article" to prevent contraception. Id.
56. Id. at 223.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 224.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 223.
62. Gardner v. Massachusetts, 305 U.S. 559 (1938) (per curiam).
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make an appearance in the case, probably due to the fact that the law was so
well settled in its official view. 63 The actual federal constitutional questions
stated were unclear. 64 No precise federal question was identified and no
"substantial" federal question was raised.
This offer of proof was the
totality of the constitutional claim: "It is sound and generally accepted
medical practice to prescribe contraceptives to protect life or health. Such
66
practice has the backing of the American Medical Association.
Dr. Gardner relied on the "due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment" but made no mention of the equal protection clause, which had
seen little use in non-race cases at the time. 67 Dr. Gardner did not explain
how the American Medical Association
and "accepted medical practice"
68
related to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Without even requesting a response, the Court summarily and
unanimously rejected Gardner's appeal on October 10, 1938. 6 9 An unsigned
per curiam opinion dismissed Gardner's appeal "for the want of a substantial
federal question." 70 In support of this decision, the Court cited several
cases. 7 1 There was nothing technical about the dismissal. It was on the
merits, and arguably the worst possible outcome.
Gardnerthus became a published opinion by the United States Supreme
Court on the merits, validating Massachusetts' complete ban on
contraceptives. 72 The decision rejected claims that physicians should be
permitted to prescribe contraceptives to patients in order to save their lives
or for their health and well-being.73 Gardner was, perhaps, worse than a
unanimous multi-page decision on the merits because it was so short and
dismissive.
When Gardner was decided, the Court consisted of Chief Justice
Charles Evan Hughes, and Justices McReynolds, Brandeis, Butler, Harlan

63. Id. at 559.
64. See Appellant's Statement as to Jurisdiction, Gardner v. Massachusetts, 305 U.S. 559 (1938)
(No. 264) (on file with author).
65. Id. at 10; Gardner, 305 U.S. at 559 (dismissing the appeal for lack of a substantial federal
question).
66. See Appellant's Statement as to Jurisdiction, Gardner v. Massachusetts, 305 U.S. 559 (1938)

(No. 264) (on file with author).
67. Id. at 11.
68. See id. The Constitution is plainly not synonymous with developing standards of accepted

medical practices.
69.

Gardner, 305 U.S. at 559.

70. Id.
71.

Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888)

(Field, J., dissenting); Jacobson v.

Massachusetts, 197 U.S. I1, 26-27 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting); Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S.
425, 428 (1926); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
72.

See Gardner, 305 U.S. at 559.

73. See Commonwealth v. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1938).
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74
Fiske Stone, Roberts, Hugo Black, and Reed. None voiced a dissent.
Given the rejection of contraception rights in Gardner,the Court in 1938,
would afford no constitutional protection to abortion rights, which were even
more taboo.
Gardner cited four cases dating from 1888 to 1926. 75 Of these cases,
Powell v. Pennsylvania, upheld by a vote of eight to one, was a precedent
fifty years out of date. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, approved by a vote of
seven to two, a law requiring smallpox vaccination. The Court's rationale
the laws was the existence of a compelling public health
for approving
•
76
interest. Lambert v. Yellowley, upheld by a vote of five to four, the 1926
Prohibition Act rule that a physician could prescribe only one pint of liquor
every ten days for medicinal purposes.7
The Court in Gardneropined that a state's power to promote health and
morals allowed it to ban all sales and prescriptions of contraceptives, even
by physicians for the most urgent life and health reasons."8 The same was
true of abortion. 9 Thus in 1938, a unanimous Court permitted both birth
control and abortion laws, in the form enacted in the latter half of the 19th
century, shortly after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.

G.

THE EARLY ABORTION-ADVERTISING-INSURANCE CASES

A second line of relevant cases not mentioned in the Roe and Doe
opinions dealt with abortion circulars in the mails, and insurance benefits for
women who had died from botched procedures after violating the early
abortion laws. The question raised in the insurance cases was whether life
insurance policies were enforceable when a woman's death was caused by
an illegal act such as abortion, or whether payment under those
circumstances was contrary to public policy.80 It would seem that if abortion
had some constitutionally protected status, the insurance companies could
not deny coverage.

74. See Gardner, 305 U.S. at 559.
75. Id.
76. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at39.
77. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 597 (1926).
78. See Gardner v. Massachusetts, 305 U.S. 559 (1938) (per curium); Commonwealth v.
Gardner, 15 N.E.2d 222, 223 (Mass. 1938).
79. Furthermore, the Court may not have wanted to entangle itself in the new subject area of
birth control, or the personal views of the Justices may have reflected a discomfort with what it
considered increasing promiscuity in the Nation.
80. Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 157 (1898).

649

Four additional Supreme Court decisions between 1877 and 1902
addressed these policies of American law toward abortion.8' The first, only
nine years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, was the 1877
case of Ex ParteJackson.82

Jackson upheld a law excluding from the mail any circulars or letters
concerning "lotteries," which were then widely considered "to have a
demoralizing influence upon the people. 8 3 The Court's unanimous decision
relied upon the example of "the act of March 3, 1873, in which Congress
declared "that no obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture,
paper, print, or other publication of an indecent character, or any article or
thing designed or intended for the prevention of conception or procuring of
abortion . . ." could be carried in the mails. 84 Such publications were
unanimously considered "corrupting. 85 Neither the First Amendment nor
any unenumerated "privacy" right protected their circulation.86
The names of the sitting Justices in the fall of 1877 are all but lost in
constitutional history: Chief Justice Waite, Justices Strong, Swayne,
Clifford, Hunt, Miller, Bradley, Field, and the first John Marshall Harlan in
his initial year on the Court.8 7 None denied that lotteries and abortion were
"corrupting" factors in American life. 88 None suggested that birth control or
abortion had any constitutional protection.89
A suicide-insurance case from 1898, Ritter v. Mutual Life Insurance

Co., was the next case to mention abortion.90 Ritter was only one year prior
to Hawker.9 A unanimous Court in Ritter held that life insurance policy
benefits need not be paid to the beneficiaries of a person who committed
suicide.2 The Court relied upon the reasoning of an early Massachusetts
insurance-abortion case:
In Hatch,93 it appears that a policy of insurance on the life of a
married woman provided that 'if the said person whose life is

81. Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362 (1902); Ritter, 169 U.S. 139; Hawker, 170
U.S. 189 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
82. Jackson, 96 U.S. at 727.
83. Id. at 736.
84. Id.
85. id.
86. See Ritter, 169 U.S. at 173-74.
87. See 96 U.S. Coverpage (1878).
88. See Jackson, 96 U.S. at 736.
89. See id
90. Ritter, 169 U.S. at 139. A train wreck case from 1893 did concern abortions, but not of
pregnant persons. Cows bearing calves were injured in large numbers in the un-memorable diversity
case of New York, Lake Erie & W.R.R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U.S. 591 (1893).
91. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
92. Ritter, 169 U.S. at 159-60.
93. Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550, 552 (1876).
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hereby insured shall die by her own act or hand, whether sane or
insane, the policy should be null and void.' It was in proof that the
assured died by reason of a miscarriage produced by an illegal
operation performed upon and voluntarily submitted to by her with
intent to cause an abortion, and without any justifiable medical
reason for such an operation. The court, observing that this
voluntary act on the part of the assured was condemned alike by the
laws of nature and by the laws of all civilized States, and was
known by the assured to be dangerous to life, said: 'We are of
opinion that no recovery can be had in this case, because the act on
the part of the assured causing death was of such a character that
public policy would preclude the defendant from insuring her
against its consequences; for we can have no question that a
contract to insure a woman against the risk of her dying under or in
consequence of an illegal operation for abortion would be contrary
to public policy, and could not be enforced in the courts of this

Commonwealth. '94

The Ritter Court went on to describe abortion as "condemned alike by
the laws of nature and by the laws of all civilized States, and ... known by
the assured to be dangerous to life."95 The Ritter Court was far from
endorsing any notion that abortion was a protected right under the
Fourteenth Amendment.96 Four years later, in Burt v. Union Central Life
Insurance Co.,97 the Court adhered to Ritter and again quoted the rationale
from the Massachusetts abortion-insurance case. 98 Lastly, Justice Holmes in
1915 had no constitutional difficulty with abortion. In United States v.
Holte,99 he explained that "a woman may conspire to procure an abortion
when, under the law, she could not commit the substantive
upon herself
100
crime."'
In sum, Hawker, Hurwitz, Ex parte Jackson, Holte, Ritter, and Burt all
condemned abortion in the period between 1877 and 1926, with Gardner
condemning contraception as recently as 1938 with definitive unanimity.

94. Ritter, 169
95. Id.

U.S. at 157.

96. See id.
97. Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co, 187 U.S. 362 (1902).
98. Id.at 370.
99. 236 U.S. 140 (1915).

100. Id. at 145.

The Court in Roe v. Wade did not cite these cases, but instead
0 cited decisions
from the same time frame that were arguably less relevant.' '
H.

THE UNENUMERATED RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Moving 35 years beyond 1938, we fast-forward to January 22, 1973.
Justice Blackmun, in Part VIII of the Roe v. Wade opinion, explained his
sources for a right of privacy as follows:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far
as Botsford, the Court has recognized that a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or
individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right
in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969), in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments... Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boydv. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928)(Brandeis, J, dissenting), in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-485, in the Ninth
Amendment, id., at 486 (Goldberg, J, concurring), or in the concept
of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' ... are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.
They also make it clear that the right has some extension to
activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967), procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542
(1942), contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453-454, id.
at 460, 463-465 (White, J., concurring in result), family
relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944),
and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the

101. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Union Pac. Railroad Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
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Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.l°2
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun and the Roe majority did not hesitate to
rely upon the 1886 Boyd and 1891 Botsford decisions, which were decided
some years before the 1898 Hawker case. Also, Justice Blackmun relied
upon Meyer (1923) and Pierce (1925), both of which were decided shortly
before the 1926 Hurwitz
abortion case. Yet, Justice Blackmun did not cite
03
1
Hurwitz.
or
Hawker
The Hurwitz, Hawker, and Ritter cases specifically addressed the
illegality of abortion in their time. Boyd, Botsford, Meyer, and Pierce had
nothing to do with abortion in any but the most general way of linguistic
over inclusion: the broad sweeping dicta of the cited cases was about very
different aspects of privacy, education, and the family.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Roe, could find no such right of
04
privacy anywhere in the Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment.'
However, according to private papers in the Library of Congress Manuscript
Division, Justices Rehnquist and White had come close to concurring in Roe
and Doe.'°5

102. Roe,410 U.S. at 152-53.
103. See id. at 116-67.
104. Id. at 172. Justice Rehnquist at least appeared not as rigid as Justice Black might have been.
Justice Rehnquist stated:
I agree with the statement of MR. JUSTICE STEWART in his concurring opinion that
the 'liberty,' against deprivation of which without due process the Fourteenth
Amendment protects, embraces more than the rights found in the Bill of Rights. But that
liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation without
due process of law.
Id. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist has used
the "rational basis" approach to deny any abortion rights, allowing legislatures to enact any
regulations and prohibitions that met this test. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
966 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. Letter from Justice Byron R. White, to Justice Blackmun (December 1, 1972); Letter from
Justice William H. Rehnquist, to Justice Blackmun (December 4, 1972) (located in the Collections
of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress and on file with the author). Justice White wrote in
a letter to Justice Blackmun: "I have been struggling with these cases. I shall probably end up
concurring in part and dissenting in part." Id. In fact, in his first year on the Court, Justice Rehnquist
wrote a similar letter three days later in which he stated: "I am about where Byron said he was with
respect to these cases; I will probably concur in part and dissent in part." Id.
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1. THE BURDEN OF HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS

History is only as relevant as a majority of the Justices make it. Going
into Roe v. Wade, the historical perspective on abortion was a confusing and
interesting mix.
In the Roe opinion, Justice Blackmun delves extensively into relevant
history, and even into some that might be considered not so relevant,' ° 6 to a
constitutional determination.
He looked to historical constitutional
precedent with privacy language. 107 He examined the common law rulings
and attitudes toward abortion.1°8
He studied the passage of the 19th century
09
abortion laws in the States.
Justice Blackmun ignored, however, the only actual Supreme Court
opinions that had anything to do with the enforcement of state abortion laws,
Hawker and Hurwitz. He also ignored Ritter, Burt, and Gardner,the only
cases dealing with the public policy of the law toward abortion and
contraception.
Justice Blackmun was considered an exceptionally bright man, and
appeared to be interested in any history related to abortion. For example, he
asked in the Roe oral reargument why the historic Hippocratic Oath had not
been mentioned in the briefs, and how that ethical prohibition was relevant
to the case." 10 Serial "okays" came from Roe-counsel Sarah Weddington,
but not any answer.'
She finally said that the Oath "does not pertain," an
arguably ambiguous answer. 2
Noticeably offended, Justice Blackmun said: "[y]ou didn't even footnote
it, because it's old?"' 13 Blackmun was a knowledgeable medical man and a
Harvard-educated scholar. He clearly thought the Oath was important, but
Ms. Weddington had no direct answer. 114 Conversely, Hawker, Hurwitz,
and Ritter were much more important than the Hippocratic Oath, but were
never mentioned at all in oral argument.
In his dissent for both Roe and Doe, Justice Rehnquist stated:
The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the
majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on

106. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (discussing abortion practices under Greek and Roman law as
well as the Hippocratic oath).
107. See id, at 152-53.

108. See id.at 130-41, 152-53.
109. See id

I 10. Transcript of Oral Argument, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18) (reargument on
Oct. I1,1972).
I1l. See id.
112. See id

113. See id
114. See id
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abortions for at least a century is a strong indication, it seems to me,
that the asserted right to an abortion is not "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental," Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
Even today, when society's views on abortion are changing, the
very existence of the debate is evidence that the "right" to an
abortion is not so universally accepted as the appellant would have
us believe.
To reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently
completely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment. As early as
1821, the first state law dealing directly with abortion was enacted
by the Connecticut Legislature. Conn. Stat., Tit. 22, §§ 14, 16. By
the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,
there were at least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial legislatures
limiting abortion. While many States have amended or updated
their laws, 21 of the laws on the books in 1868 remain in effect
today. Indeed, the Texas statute struck down today was, as the
majority notes, first enacted in 1857 and "has remained
substantially unchanged to the present time."
There apparently was no question concerning the validity of this
provision or of any of the other state statutes when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted. The only conclusion possible from this
history is that the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth
Amendment withdraw from the States the power to legislate with
respect to this matter. 15
Justice White also was troubled by what he considered the disregard of
legal and constitutional history in the Roe/Doe majority opinion. He stated:
With all due respect, I dissent. I find nothing in the language or
history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The
Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for
pregnant [women] and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its
action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most
existing state abortion statutes. The upshot is that the people and
115. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the legislatures of the 50 States are constitutionally disentitled to
weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and
development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of
possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand. As an exercise
of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it
does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and
extravagant exercise of the power
6 of judicial review that the
Constitution extends to this Court." 1
The even more fragmented Supreme Court of 1992 in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. 7 addressed the historical issue this way:
It is also tempting, for the same reason, to suppose that the Due
Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most
specific level, that were protected against government interference
by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
But such a view would be inconsistent with our law. [Author's
Note: No citations. No discussion. No Fourteenth Amendment
support.] It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter. We have
vindicated this principle before. Marriage is mentioned nowhere in
the Bill of Rights, and interracial marriage was illegal in most States
in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt correct in finding it
to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v.
Virginia.119
That statement, however, was not necessarily any more than the view of
Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, a mere one-third of the nine
Justices.
J. THE CHAOTIC ROE-DOE LITIGATION "STRATEGY"

The writings are so vast; an encyclopedia could be published consisting
of articles, briefs, and books about abortion, and the abortion
cases of
20
9
be.'
to
ever
likely
not
and
sight,
in
nowhere
is
end
The
1973.''
116. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
117. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
118. Id. at 847-48 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967)).
119. DAVID GARROW, LIBERTY & SEXUALITY (University of California Press 1994) [hereinafter

GARROW]. GARROW sets out historical private papers, interviews with law clerks, and private
information from Justices, parties to litigation, counsel, families, friends, and foes. Any critical
analysis by GARROW is only diminished slightly by his chronological approach, 20 year distance
from the events, and lack of training as a strategic litigator of complex multidisciplinary medical and
health cases. Three years of law school and 3,000 hours per year working at litigation can make a
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While Roe is the landmark case of the 20th century, aspects of it are
often criticized, from the inside and out. 12 1 Detractors point to the absence
of a physician-plaintiff not under indictment, the perfunctory trials of only a
few hours each at most, the failure to present any expert medical testimony
or evidence, the false claim of rape by Jane Roe, the altogether at-bestaverage oral arguments on both sides, the extensive medical-health journal
evidence submitted on appeal but never cross-examined, 122 the shifting
grounds of decision, 123 the disputed and politically tainted decision to
reargue, the absence of any constitutional privacy right in the text of the
Constitution, 124 and the legislative appearance 125 of the opinions, among
others.
The process also raised concerns from within the Court itself. The
individual Justices typically research and decide these cases in separate,
unique ways. Justices each have three or more law clerks' 26 to conduct
Grand Canyon chasm of difference in one's perception and analysis of matters. Seasoned litigators
tend to evaluate material differently from others, as it relates to evidence, rules of procedure, trial
strategy, argumentation, and precedent. I have yet to hear of a historian, journalist, or political
scientist who has studied and practiced evidence or trial technique. Justice Scalia had something
right when he stated: "The first year of law school makes an enormous impact upon the mind ... a
sort of intellectual rebirth, the acquisition of a whole new mode of perceiving and thinking." Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3-9 (Princeton 1997).
120. One's viewpoint on abortion sometimes may depend upon metaphysical value judgments.
Those may be highly subjective, inflexible, too flexible, ill-informed, excessively informed, devout,
whimsical, or even delusional. To some a fetus is a small human and a treasure. To others an
unwanted pregnancy is a life-threatening curse and the fetus a parasite.
121. See generally, Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure,
33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21 (1978).
122. Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
commented that the wealth of medical literature introduced in Roe and Doe was only done for the
first time at the Supreme Court level. Id. at 37.
123. The holding, in at least one of the printed draft opinions, changed on each of the following
issues: mandatory hospitalization, stage of pregnancy, residency, and vagueness. See Bernard
Schwartz, How a Legal Landmark Manque Became a Constitutional Cause Celebre, in
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT (Oxford 1988).
124. Justices Black and Stewart in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-09 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting), had argued in dissent that no right of privacy should be recognized because there was
none in the text of the Constitution and were unwilling to draw an inferential right to privacy from
analogous case law. Id. at 509-10.
125. See Archibald Cox, Storm Over the Supreme Court, in THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 10
(Norman Dorsen ed., Harper & Row 1987). A common criticism of the Roe/Doe opinions is that
they look just like statutory or legislative decrees, not judicial opinions, and "substitute judicially
determined values and judicial rules" for those of the legislative branches. Id.
126 Supreme Court law clerks are usually at the top of their class at the top law schools in the
country. They now come from federal appellate clerkships, with first rate published journal articles,
and with the highest of recommendations from law professors and deans. Such proficiency helps to

research, write summary memos, draft opinions, and act as captive audiences
in testing theories and arguments. 127 Lastly, litigation is not softball, with
hits, runs, wins, and losses. It is a complex process requiring mental skills
not unlike grandmaster 2chess.
Lawyers also do not win or lose cases, in the
8
cause-and-effect sense. 1
In the Roe/Doe litigation within the Court, Chief Justice Burger posed
the first question in oral argument; whether United States v. Vuitch
foreclosed the vagueness argument. 129
Ms. Weddington suggested that the term "life" was more indefinite than
"health."' 3 ° She did not refer to numerous lower courts that had carefully
explained how the expression "preserve the life" was vague and unworkable
in practice from hospital-to-hospital. 13 1 Instead she pointed out that the
Texas Supreme Court had upheld the law as not vague and relied
on Vuitch
' 32
in that respect, reliance that was, in her opinion, "misplaced."'
Interestingly, Justice Stewart posited the followed comment: "I trust
you are going to get to what provisions of the Constitution you rely

make up for their lack of experience. Law clerks are expected to grasp the subtleties of hundreds of
important and complex appeals to the Court in a very short period of time. However, even the clerks
do not always influence decisions by the Justices. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT, 1617 (Congressional Quarterly 3d ed. 1989). It is therefore hard to imagine how counsel such as
Weddington, Hames, Floyd, or Beasley made any serious positive difference. Based on Justice
Blackmun's comments, this conclusion is not a difficult one to reach.
127. The entire Library of Congress is one block away from and available to the Court.
128. The work of the Justices and that of the Court could accurately be described as intervening
independent causes that supercede any input from the advocates. It may be helpful at this juncture to
discuss oral arguments at the Supreme Court in general. Oral argument is definitely a misnomer.
Lawyers typically do not stand up and launch argument. The reality is that lawyers are there to
answer questions, but they may make useful points if and when they can. The most effective oral
arguments are those in which the Justices take extensive notes, ask sympathetic questions, demolish
the other counsel, and draft a favorable decision using some of the advocate's own words. The
"lore" of the Supreme Court is that oral arguments may persuade a vote or two. The Justices look
primarily to their own research and the written briefs.
The initial impressions a Justice has of an appeal are from a one-page law clerk memo on whether
the case should be heard at all. Then the Justices see the printed briefs before they hear oral
argument, if they take the time. Lastly, in a stressful atmosphere, the nine Justices cross-examine the
advocates for 30 minutes each, with sometimes clever and pointed questions, to elicit information on
matters of fact or law, concessions, or admissions, perhaps even agony.
A preferable procedure may be for judges and lawyers to gather around a large conference table
with their clients and discuss the essence of a case back-and-forth in a more efficient unpressured
setting. The formality of appellate courts today is an unnecessary anachronism, an inefficient ritual
without back-and-forth discussion and negotiation. We deserve something more efficient and better
organized than the current shooting gallery.
129. 402 U.S. 62, 63-66 (1971).
130. 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 812 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
131. Id. at 813-15. Indeed, the Vuitch case was easily distinguishable as involving a federal law
that the Court could and did interpret broadly. The Court could not so interpret a state law, because
that was the role of the state courts.
132. Seeid. at815.
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on ....
[we] cannot here be involved simply with matters of policy, as you
' 133
know.
Ms. Weddington responded to Justice Stewart with reliance upon the
Ninth Amendment,' 34 which Justice Stewart had ridiculed in his Griswold
separate opinion.1 35 Ms. Weddington also erroneously referred to the
Fourteenth Amendment as an appropriate place to rest her Constitutional
argument due
to its "rights of persons to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
36
happiness."
Justices White and Stewart further questioned Weddington about the
relevance of the stages of pregnancy, from conception up to birth. She
observed that there was more of an "emotional" reaction to advanced
pregnancies. 37 She did not back away from claiming an absolute right of
abortion throughout pregnancy.' 38 But again, Ms. Weddington let pass the
39
opportunity to answer briefly and make strong positive points. 1
The argument by Mr. Floyd, representing the State of Texas was equally
weak. Throughout the arguments, there was no mention of the names
40
Hawker, Hurwitz, Jackson, Ritter, or Burt, not by any Justice or lawyer.'

133. Id.
134. 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supranote 130, at 788.
135. In Griswold Justice Stewart had written:
But to say that the Ninth Amendment has anything to do with this case is to turn
somersaults with history. The Ninth Amendment... was framed by James Madison and
adopted by the States simply to make clear that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not
alter the plan that the Federal Government was to be a government of express and limited
powers, and that all rights and powers not delegated to it were retained by the people and
the individual States. Until today no member of this Court has ever suggested that the
Ninth Amendment meant anything else, and the idea that a federal court could ever use
the Ninth Amendment to annul a law passed by the elected representatives of the people
of [a] ...State ...would have caused James Madison no little wonder.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529-30 (1965).
136. HistoricalPerspective: Roe v. Wade Oral Arguments, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 315, 323
(1998). The Fourteenth Amendment includes no right to pursue happiness. That phrase is in the
Declaration of Independence, not the United States Constitution or the Bill of Rights.
137. 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supranote 130, at 789-90.
138. Justice White appeared to be offended from that point forward that this young Texas lawyer
was so unfamiliar with his and Justice Stewart's approach and concerns that dated back in print to
Griswold.
139. Chief Justice Burger used the inadequate arguments as a good reason to insist upon
reargument, with the two new Nixon-appointees participating. Burger's memo to all Justices stated:
"Perhaps my problem arises from the mediocre to poor help from counsel. On reargument, I would
propose we appoint amici for both sides." Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E Burger, to the
Conference (May 31, 1972) (on file with author). No documents indicate that any of the Justices
disagreed with his evaluation of the oral argument. The Court was on its own, but at least it had
extensive briefs and medical and public health literature from the amici curiae on both sides.
140. See HistoricalPerspective: Roe v. Wade Oral Arguments, supra note 136, at 315.
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K. INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WITH ROE
The seven Justices convened three days after argument to discuss the
disposition of Roe and Doe, 14at1 the scheduled 10:00 AM, Thursday,
December 16, 1971, conference.
Chief Justice Burger of course presided over the seven men and opened
the discussion, followed by the other Justices in descending order of service
on the Court. 142 Chief Justice Burger suggested at the outset that neither the
Doe couple nor Dr. Hallford had standing because of the speculative nature
of the Doe's claims143 and because of Dr. Hallford's pending state court
criminal proceeding. The Texas lawyers had not organized or involved an
unindicted physician,144 so only Jane Roe remained.'4 Chief Justice Burger
certainly concluded that Ms. Roe had standing, but otherwise, he just
touched upon various issues147in the case. 146 He thought the law was not
necessarily unconstitutional.
Justice Douglas next expressed his opinion that the Texas law was
unconstitutionally vague. 148 Justice Brennan was both willing to find the

Texas law unconstitutionally vague, and to 49
affirm the district court decision
on privacy and Ninth Amendment grounds. 1
Justice Stewart thought that a state law could limit the performance of
abortions tojhysicians, and might be able to draw lines at later stages of
pregnancy.
Justice White felt that Ms. Weddington had overstated her case to insist
upon abortion up to birth, for choice alone, on demand, without regard to
any health needs of the woman.15 1 Justice White, however, despite his
dissatisfaction with the oral argument, had still not decided what to do on the
merits. 152

141. Schwartz, supra note 123, at 84.
142. Id
143.

THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985):

THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND

NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 806 (Del Dickson ed., 200 1)
144. That strategic omission of a "respectable plaintiff' in the Roe case was odd. Doctors all over
the U.S. were willing to challenge the State abortion laws as plaintiffs adversely affected by the law.
The omission again shows the insufficient background of the Texas team in federal litigation
practice and tactics.
145. Dickson, supra note 143, at 806.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 806-807. See also Schwartz, supra note 123, at 85.
150. Dickson, supra note 143, at 807.
151.

Id.

152. Id.
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Justice Marshall stated his straightforward view that abortion in early
pregnancy was
a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth
53
Amendment.
Lastly, Justice Blackmun discussed generally his already complicated
views on a number of aspects of the case. He would invalidate the Texas
law on at least Ninth Amendment grounds, but he thought the original
Georgia law had been a "fine statute" until the lower court ruined it.' 54 55
Chief
Justice Burger then moved on to the Doe v. Bolton Georgia discussion. 1
In the conference no Justice ever mentioned Hawker, Hurwitz, Jackson,
156
Ritter, or the status of abortion in the last decades of the 19th century.
This likely would have been the province of Justice Rehnquist, but he had
not yet been sworn in, and ultimately, not even he ever referred to the
several prior abortion decisions.
Next came the decision as to who should write the opinions of the
Court. Justice Brennan might have written opinions of equal or better
caliber than Justice Blackmun, but he would probably have lost the vote of
Chief Justice Burger, possibly part of Justice Blackmun's, and certainly that
of Justice White. 17
Justice Blackmun accepted the assignment to draft initial opinions in
Roe and Doe, and began in relative solitude to research and write.' 58 He
would 5 roduce preliminary draft printed opinions for both cases in May of
1972.
Following the Roe/Doe conference, the 1879 Texas law was doomed. 160
Justice Blackmun, on May 18, 1972, distributed a memorandum to his
waiting colleagues.' 6 1 Attached was a 16-page printed draft opinion in Roe
v. Wade. 162 Justice Blackmun explained that his draft opinion would hold
the Texas abortion law unconstitutionally vague, although he was still

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 808.
156. See id. at 806-8 10.
157. See generally Schwartz, supranote 123, at 86-87.
158. ld. at 89.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 86.
161. Id. at 89. This draft is reprinted in Schwartz, supra note 123, at 103-120. The manuscript
archives in the Library of Congress also have several copies of the memorandum and initial draft
opinion [on file with the author] within the collections of Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall,
from which the majority of this section can also be substantiated.
162. Id.

flexible. 16 3 He also stated
64 his view that the Georgia case should be reargued
before all nine Justices.
Dr. Hallford and the "speculative" Does were out of the case entirely for
lack of standing.' 65 Justice Blackmun also made an extensive argument in
his draft that the expression "saving the life" was unconstitutionally
vague.166 He was not yet ready to put forth the right of privacy or Ninth
Amendment theories.
The result of Justice Blackmun's analysis, had this opinion become
final, would have been that the majority of abortion laws nationally were
unconstitutionally vague. States may or may not enact new, more specific
statutes. Many would. Others would not, depending on local politics and
the value accorded by legislators to the potential life within each such State.
The core privacy issue was to be postponed for another day; if Justice
Blackmun's original approach had won out. However, it did not.
Justice Brennan sent Justice Blackmun a letter immediately on May 18,
1972.167 He urged that the Court go beyond vagueness and decide "the core
constitutional question." He suggested that his view was "shared by Bill
[Douglas], Potter [Stewart], [and] Thurgood [Marshall],"
and possibly by
16
Justice Blackmun as well, "at least in this Texas case."
Soon, the Court majority decided to hold the cases over for reargument
before the entire nine Justices, including
now Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
69
and Justice William H. Rehnquist.
On October 11, 1972, the Supreme Court heard oral reargument in Roe
170
v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, with essentially the same cast of characters,
plus two more decision-makers, Justices Powell and Rehnquist. 17 1 Justice
Rehnquist was considered politically conservative and therefore unlikely to
cast a vote in agreement with Justice Blackmun. Conversely, Justice Powell
had friends and relatives in the medical profession and was a past-president
of the American Bar Association, which had endorsed elective abortion. It
is unclear, however whether those relationships impacted his views on the
Constitution and Bill of Rights in the abortion context.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 89.
Id. at 91.
Id.at 109-12
Id. at 115-17.
Id. at 90, 144.
Id. at 144.
Id.at 147.
Id. at 148. A different Texan would represent the State of Texas, Attorney General Flowers.
Id.
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L.

REARGUMENTOFROE

Ms. Weddington began her second argument in Roe with a familiar
recitation of facts and constitutional amendments, nothing directly
72
responsive to the known points with which the Court was struggling.
Those struggles had to do with late pregnancy and "viability" limitations, the
legislative versus judicial role, the issues related to the government's interest
in the life of the fetus earlier posed by Justices Stewart and White, and the
"vagueness question" that had not yet gone away. 173
Initially, Ms. Weddington claimed, "Griswold, of course is the primary
case,"' 174 even though Griswold was 76decided in part based on marital
privacy.

175

Jane Roe was not married.1

Ms. Weddington also made no mention of the significant recent
Eisenstadt case, 17 7 or the article by former Justice Tom Clark, Religion,
Morality and Abortion. 78 Those were arguably authoritative supporting
legal authority in favor of Ms. Weddington's position, but she neglected to
mention them in oral argument. These failures were probably obvious to
some observers and the Justices.
Once again, the questions and arguments about the interests of the fetus
came to Ms. Weddington through Justices White and Stewart. 179 One
Justice inquired: "Is it critical to your case that the fetus not be a person
under the due process clause?"' 80 She did not answer as concisely as she
could have by referring quickly to the "born or naturalized" language of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Another question: "Would you lose your case if
the fetus was a person?"''
Again, Ms. Weddington offered no explicit yes

172. Transcript of Reargument, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18) [hereinafter
Transcript of Reargument], reprinted in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENT OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 808 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1975).

173. See Schwartz, supranote 123, at 148.
174. Transcriptof Reargument, supra note 172.
175. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
176. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973).
177. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (stating in dicta that Griswold should apply with
equal force to non-married persons).
178. Tom Clark, Religion Morality and Abortion, 2 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (1969) (arguing that the
right of abortion is within a zone of liberty interests which the state can only abrogate if its interests
outweigh.).
179. Transcriptof Reargument, supra note 172, at 812-814.
180. Id. at 813.
181. Id.

82
or no answer, only a suggestion that "balancing" would then be in order.'
Another Justice asked: "Do you make any distinction between the first
month, and ninth month of gestation?"' 183 Ms. Weddington answered
indirectly that "[o]ur statute does not."' 84 Ms. Weddington seemed
unwilling to deal with the expected questions regarding the interests of the
fetus, perhaps because she wanted the right to abortion to be absolute.
However, she did not seem to accept that no Justice agreed with her on that
point. Finally, Ms. Weddington sat down. Roe was now in the hands and
minds of the nine Justices, as it always had been.
Even before October 11, 1972, notes from the conference suggest that
the Justices were tentatively lined up to invalidate the Texas statute and
statutes like it.' 85 Ms. Weddington never mentioned Justice White's
approach in Griswold or Baird. However, neither did Texas Attorney
General Flowers argue to that effect, because those two cases did not help
the Texas case in any way.i6
What did the lawyers not argue that they might have?
First, obviously, Hawker, Hurwitz, Ritter, and the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment might have been argued. This could have brought
in the votes of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, making the decision
five to four, but it probably would not have had that effect because they
appeared committed on stronger grounds than mere history.
Second, neither side made any reference to the particularized concerns
of Justice Stewart, which he had voiced earlier, and in his dissent in
Griswold.187 Justice Stewart was often a strong voice in argument and in
conference, someone to be reckoned with, not ignored.
Third, neither set of lawyers formulated a rationale to decide the case in
their favor using the framework previously espoused by Justice White in
Griswold, Baird, and other cases. With Justice White, the most important
tactic in past cases had been whether the State interest was insufficient,
arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory. 88 Failure to make this argument was
a grave tactical omission by both sides.

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. A more solid appropriate answer might have been: I do make a distinction after
'viability' when the fetus is capable of independent survival. The State then might limit abortions
and allow only those required by a woman for reasons of her health. Ninety-percent-plus of
abortions, however, are done in the first trimester when the State has no legitimate interest beyond
requiring that a qualified physician be involved.
185. See Schwartz, supra note 123, at 146-47.
186. See Transcript of Reargument, supra note 172.
187. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Dickson, supra note 143, at
807.
188. See Dickson, supra note 143, at 807.
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Finally, no one reached out for Justice Rehnquist's vote at all. He had
been on the Court only nine months, but the confirmation hearings should
have illustrated that his interests lay in constitutional history and early
precedent, a very traditional approach that often reached the most
conservative result.' 89
In sum, none of the lawyers appeared sufficiently knowledgeable to
understand how to build a winning decision vote-by-vote.
M. PRIVACY, HEALTH, OR VAGUENESS?

Justice Blackmun circulated a Memorandum to the conference on
November9 21, 1972, with a printed draft of his proposed views and
opinions.' 0
As to the void for vagueness argument, Justice Blackmun reversed his
previous approach to declaring the Texas law unconstitutional on that
ground.'91 While he personally still considered the statute vague, he had
moved on to the core constitutional question of a right of privacy92under the
Ninth Amendment and the "liberty" protection of the Fourteenth.
At this stage, Justice Blackmun had "concluded that the end of the first
trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other selected
point,
193
such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary," in his view.
Justice Douglas joined the two opinions.' 94 Justice Stewart joined the
Blackmun opinions on November 27, 1972, and indicated he might write
separately in concurrence. 195
Justice Marshall, on December 12, 1972, penned a letter to Justice
Blackmun endorsing the "viability" line, and explaining that this would
better accommodate "the difficulties which many women may have in
,196
believing that they are pregnant and deciding to seek an abortion ....
Justice Brennan on the following day, December 13, 1972, sent a threepage letter to "Dear Harry," expressing "basic agreement" with Justice
Blackmun and adding a few suggestions.
189. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 123, at 148 (stating that Justice Rehnquist had expressed early
on that he did not want to second guess legislatures).
190. Id.
191. Id.
at 148.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 149.
194. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 115.
195. Schwartz, supra note 123, at 151.
196. Id.at 149.
197. Idat 150.

Justice Brennan, too, was clarifying the conceptual difficulties of what
regulations to allow when, and in support of what state interests. He was of
the opinion that state interests in the life of the fetus could not be asserted
until viability.198 State interests in health and safety might arise earlier, after
the first trimester, perhaps at sixteen to twenty-four weeks, at which time a
medically informed legislature could enact licensing standards for safety
reasons.
N.

REVISIONS TOWARDS A FINAL OPINION

On December 21, 1972, Justice Blackmun distributed a further
memorandum and revised opinions. 20 This was to be virtually the final
form of the opinions released Monday, January 22, 1973.201
The Roe and Doe opinions at various and multiple points rejected the
absolutist personal right to use one's body in any way.2 °2 There also was no
reference either to Hawker or Hurwitz or the relevance of events closer to
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The extensive creative efforts of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Powell,
and Marshall appear throughout the pages of the opinions and the
conclusions. The precedent cited most strongly and looming most large is
the 1972 opinion by Justice Brennan in Eisenstadt v. Baird. °3
Material from the gray brief for Roe is evident throughout the two
opinions. All of the historical privacy cases cited were first set out in the
gray brief, and actually much
earlier in the author's 1968 article, all except
204
Hawker and Hurwitz that is.
0.

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE STEWART

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a five page concurring opinion in Roe to
explain his relatively new view "that the right asserted ... is embraced

198. Id.
199. See id,

200. ld.
201.

Id.

202. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, No 70-40, at 8, 9, 10, 11 (May 25, 1972) (1st draft) reprinted in
Schwartz, supra note 123. This was no surprise. There is no indication in the developing case
history or the published opinions that oral argument impacted any of the key successes in the two
decisions.
203. 405 U.S. 438(1972).
204. See Roy Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of
State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. Rev. 730 (1968). Those basic privacy/family cases were the
dissents in Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); and Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250 (1891).
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within the personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. " 205 Justice Stewart found that the "inflexible
criminal statute" 20 6 in Texas could not "survive the 'particularly careful
scrutiny' that the Fourteenth Amendment here requires." 20 7 The Stewart
analysis was of the kind employed by Justice Harlan some years back, and
2 °8
by Justice White in Griswold and Eisenstadt.
Ms. Weddington and Ms. Hames contributed' nothing to the
strengthening of the Stewart opinion, and likely contributed to the failure to
reel in the vote of Justice White, and with it, Justice Rehnquist.
P. CONCURRING OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER

Chief Justice Burger swore in Richard Nixon for a second term as
President of the United States before the Roe and Doe opinions came down
on January 22, 1973. 2 09 Burger surprised many knowledgeable people by
voting with Blackmun to overturn the Texas and Georgia laws. Probably
without realizing or intending to do so, Chief Justice Burger seemed to adopt
the "right to health" argument that had drifted about on the periphery of the
case. Chief Justice Burger expressed his holding in these words:
I agree that, under the Fourteenth Amendment... the abortion
statutes of Georgia and Texas impermissibly limit the performance
of abortions necessary to protect the health of the pregnant
women,
21
using the term health in its broadest medical context. §
The Chief took a swing at the arguing counsel with his last sentence:
"Plainly the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires
21
abortion on demand." 1

205. Roe, 410 U.S. at 170 (Powell, J., concurring).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 169.
208. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring); Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 464 (White, J.,
concurring).
209. See Library of Congress, American Memory: HistoricalCollectionsfor the NationalDigital
Library, at http://www.memory.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
210. Roe, 410 U.S. at207.
211. Id. at 208.
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Q.

THE OVERRULING CONUNDRUM

21 2
As Justice Stevens observed, concurring in Stenberg v. Carhart,

[D]uring the past 27 years, the central holding of Roe v. Wade, has
been endorsed by all but 4 of the 17 Justices who have addressed
the issue. That holding [is] that the word 'liberty' in the Fourteenth
Amendment includes a woman's right to make this difficult and
213
extremely personal decision ....
Justice Scalia, nonetheless, persistently asserts that Roe, Casey, and
presumably many other cases must be overruled. As he stated in Stenberg:
"If only for the sake of its own preservation, the Court should return this
matter to the people-where the Constitution, by its silence on the subject,
left it-and let them decide, State by1 4State, whether this practice should be
2
allowed. Casey must be overruled.,
The pros and cons, and the methodology and impact of a decision
overruling the thirty-year line of precedent recognizing an abortion "liberty"
right are a very complex and exceedingly important problem in American
Supreme Court jurisprudence, appropriate for another article by another
author on another day. The outcome is very much dependent upon the
persuasion of swing votes and new as-yet-unappointed Justices. The Court
has the power to rule either way. The Nation will not collapse with either
215
result.
R.

CONCLUSION

The Abortion Cases of 1973216 and subsequent decisions adhering to
them have completely ignored the only Supreme Court cases that discussed
abortion at all since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hawker
v. New York,217 Missouri ex rel Hurwitz v. North,21821Ex Parte Jackson,2 19

212. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
213. Id. at 946. (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (internal citation omitted).
214. Id. at 956 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. To be abundantly clear, despite this interesting history, I personally am of the opinion that
most living Justices could write persuasive opinions reaching the same result as Roe and Doe. We
must live with ourselves and make decisions based upon contemporary constitutional analysis,
instead of being slaves to the opinions of long-deceased Justices from centuries past who were
unaware of modem health, psychology, and the broad idea of the progress of civilization. To do
otherwise is ancestor worship at its most oppressive.
216. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
217. 170 U.S. 189(1898).
218. 271 U.S. 40 (1926).
219. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
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and Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York. 120 Those cases treated the
validity of the 19th century abortion laws as a given, plain enough not to
require discussion or argument. Both came much closer in time to the
ratification and early implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment:
221
122
Hawker in 1898,
and Hurwitz in 1926. 22 The path of the Massachusetts
birth control case Gardner showed that the Court was inclined to leave the
State legislatures alone to set policy in matters of morals and public health,
such as contraception and abortion.223 Gardner,if anything reinforced the
continuing validity of both the Hawker and Hurwitz outlook on the world of
morals, bad character, birth control, and abortion. That was 65 years ago,
more or less, and may seem archaic, but does the Fourteenth Amendment of
1868 forbid it in our scheme of constitutional government? Perhaps.
Roe was not quite a half-century after Hurwitz, and 35 years after
Gardner. Those are brief time periods in the world of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Below is the relevant timetable of events:
1868- Fourteenth Amendment confirmed.224
1877- Ex parte Jackson
refers to abortion circulars in the mail as subject
225
to prohibition.
1898- Ritter decision notes that abortion is dangerous and should be
condemned (30 years passed).226
1898- Hawker decision enforces the New York law.227
228
1926- Hurwitz decision enforces the Missouri law (28 more years) .
1938- Gardner decision approves a ban on contraceptives (12 more
years).229
1973 - Roe/Doe decriminalizes abortion (35 further years).230
As to the remedy for the Hawker-Hurwitz-Jackson-Ritteroversight, only
a partial remedy, if any, is possible. In a sense this article is a personal
remedy, a published acknowledgment that several other substantially
adverse relevant cases in the Roe and Doe litigation were not even alluded to
by any of the nine Justices at the relevant time.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

169 U.S. 139 (1898).
170 U.S. 189(1898).
271 U.S. 40(1926).
See Commonwealth v. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1938).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Jackson, 96 U.S. at 736.
Ritter, 169 U.S. at 157.
Hawker, 170 U.S. at 578.
Hurwitz, 271 U.S. at 43.
Gardner, 15 N.E.2d. at 224.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
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The lawyers for the States of Texas and Georgia, as well as numerous
amici counsel, of course were the principal individuals who should have
unearthed and developed Hawker and Hurwitz, but did not. Instead, the
debate will continue, and from now on Hawker, Hurwitz, Jackson, Ritter,

and Gardner will 23hopefully be on the balancing scales to allow a more
honest disputation. t

23 !. 1 have no pony in this race, only an interest, more of a curiosity for watching the historical
record evolve.

